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I. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet Union aims to greatly expand its influence in
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and in Western Europe
as a whole. At the same time, it seeks to reduce U.S.
influence in the area. The ultimate goal is to maximize
both these trends and produce Soviet hegemony over all of
Europe. The Kremlin would prefer to accomplish this task
without armed conflict, providing the minimum risk of
failure and the minimum cost.
To attain its goals in Western Europe and the FRG the
Kremlin has employed strategies of confrontation and
cooperation, often simultaneously. In certain periods it
has emphasized one approach more than the other. Since the
late 1950' s the Soviet Union has relied on a policy of
"peaceful coexistence" and rapprochement with the West to
further its goals in Europe. Peaceful coexistence, which
was introduced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress
in 1956, is a means for Moscow to ostensibly renounce the
use of force in international disputes while still
justifying it to support the class struggle for socialist
revolution. This policy of detente has produced an
atmosphere of reduced East-West tensions. This in turn has
fostered disunity and self-restraint in the Atlantic
Alliance regarding Western security measures. It has also
cast the Soviet Union in a more favorable light making it
appear less aggressive and dangerous to its neighbors.
Ultimately, these developments have allowed the Kremlin to
make significant progress in weakening U.S. influence in
Western Europe and strengthening its own.
Through its policy of detente the Soviet Union seeks to
exploit and, at the same time, transform the status quo of a
Europe divided between two opposing power blocs. The Soviet
Union attempts to use its relationship with one member of
the Western Alliance (the Federal Republic) to influence the
policies of another (the United States) . This strategy can
be implemented most effectively in an atmosphere of detente.
Reduced East-West tensions and the specter of a less
threatening Eastern foe also allow the Soviet Union to
continue its efforts to achieve a wide margin of military
superiority while drawing less attention to this development
and less action from the West to counter it. If carried to
the extreme these trends could cause the Alliance to evolve
into a politically fragmented, militarily inferior
organization, and allow the Soviet Union to dominate Western
Europe.
The Soviet Union uses the close ties it has developed
with the FRG as a result of detente to further its goals in
Western Europe. As the most powerful non-nuclear West
European nation and a member of NATO, West Germany is firmly
anchored to the West. As the Western half of a land divided
between opposing Eastern and Western power blocs it is
emotionally torn and divided. Pulled between its security
needs from the West and its interests in political and
economic ties with the East, the FRG is a perfect target of
Soviet influence. The Kremlin uses its influence in the FRG
to affect U.S. and NATO policies and the overall strength of
the Alliance.
This thesis examines apparent Soviet attempts to use
detente to exploit the FRG ' s membership in NATO. The FRG's
interest in secure political and economic relations with
East Germany and the Warsaw Pact provide the Soviet Union
with a lever of influence— i.e., to push the FRG to pressure
the U.S. into economic and defense policies more favorable
to the Soviet Union. Even if the U.S. fails to react in the
desired fashion, the policy may still succeed by causing
conflict and disunity in the Alliance. 1 In the same way,
the Soviet Union can apply pressure to the U.S. and NATO for
arms reduction or "military detente." 2 Supporting military
detente or a slowing of the East-West arms race as a result
of reduced tensions allows Moscow to work toward reducing
Western arsenals while building up its own behind the
smokescreen of "detente." This process can be assisted by
1Pierre Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance,"
Problems of Communism (May-June 1981), p. 52.
2 Pekinq Review , 1 January 1976, No. 2, p. 18, cited in
A Lexicon of Marxist-Leninist Semantics , ed. Raymond S.
Sleeper (Alexandria, Virginia: Western Goals, 1983), p. 85.
East-West arms negotiations which often result in an
improved military posture for the Warsaw Pact. Achieving an
uncontested military superiority over the West would allow
the Soviets to intimidate or blackmail members of the
Alliance when cooperation fails and coercion becomes
necessary.
This thesis explores the hypothesis that the Soviet
Union chooses to exploit the FRG's position in NATO by
cultivating a special relationship with West Germany rather
than making overt efforts to force a split between it and
the U.S. It appears that the Kremlin prefers, to use its
detente approach with the FRG to gradually produce a weak,
easily dominated Western Europe over a more confrontational
strategy which might abruptly break up the NATO Alliance or
cause the West to agree on a program of effective
political-military countermeasures . An abrupt end to NATO
could produce a more unified Western Europe or destabilize
Eastern Europe , both highly undesirable results in Moscow's
view.
This thesis focuses on the instruments the Soviet Union
uses to maximize its influence in the FRG to attain its
foreign policy objectives in the region. Chapter II reviews
the history of Russo-German conflict and coexistence and
closely examines current Soviet objectives in Western Europe
and in the FRG plus Soviet peacetime strategies for
attaining them. Chapter III expounds on the specific items
of national interest that make West Germany vulnerable to
Soviet influence, and how the Kremlin attempts to use these
as instruments to further its goals in the FRG and Western
Europe. In Chapter IV the effectiveness of Soviet policies
in the FRG is analyzed; specific political successes and
failures are examined. Future prospects are also discussed
in this section, including hypothetical long term outcomes
to present strategies and those that might result from more
aggressive "wedge-driving" tactics. The last chapter
summarizes the paper's arguments and conclusions.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND3
The historical relationship between Russia and Germany
has been one of alternating enmity and cooperation. Each
has a traditional fear of (and contempt for) the other,
mixed with respect for its cultural, scientific and even
military achievements. A brief look at the progression of
the love-hate relationship between Russia and Germany
through the modern period will be useful in gaining a
clearer perspective on the current relationship between the
two states.
Until its unification in 1871, what was called Germany
was actually a conglomeration of many separate sovereignties
(over 300 before the French Revolution and 38 after the
3Much of the historical information and interpretation
in this section is taken from Walter Laqueur's Russia and
Germany: A Century of Conflict (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1965)
, pp.
Congress of Vienna in 1815) . There was also the German
kingdom of Prussia and the German parts of the Austrian
Empire. At the Congress of Vienna all these states were
brought together to form the Germanic Confederation under
the permanent presidency of Austria. After drawing Austria
into the Seven Weeks War of 1866 and France into the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870 and defeating them both, Prussia
(through the efforts of Minister President Bismarck and King
William I) succeeded in usurping Austrian control over the
various German states, and unified them, with Prussia, into
one independent nation.
The nineteenth century is marked by a prevailing
Russo-German friendship. Communication and cooperation was
facilitated by ideological homogeneity, the frequent
familial ties between both monarchs and nobility, a common
language (German or French) and the fact that many Russian
statesmen were actually Germans (there were too few educated
Russians to fill all the posts and many Russian aristocrats
viewed state service as demeaning). 4 The inclination toward
close Russo-German collaboration in this period had its
beginnings in the Napoleonic Wars. After the French defeat
of Prussia, German and Prussian armies were enlisted by
Napoleon to attack Russia. Soon after the attack began the
Prussian commander General Yorck deserted the French with
4Walter Laqueur, Russia and Germany: A Century of
Conflict (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965)
,
p. 16.
his troops and joined the armies of the tsar in a German
campaign. This move culminated in a treaty of neutrality
between Prussia and Russia (the Convention of Tauroggen in
December 1812) , and their cooperative liberation of Prussia
and Germany.
The spirit of Tauroggen continued through the
Bismarckian era with the formation of the Three Emperors
'
League (Germany, Russia and Austria) in 1871 and the signing
of the Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty in 1887. Indeed,
many historians believe that if William II had not allowed
the Russo-German treaty to lapse in 1890, the chain of
events which led to Germany's subsequent political isolation
and even the outbreak of the first world war might have been
averted. During World War I Germany had all but defeated
Russia when the new Bolshevik regime chose to sign a
separate peace treaty with Germany at Brest Litovsk in
December 1917 (in an effort to safeguard the regime) , and
paid for the treaty by relinquishing control of Poland,
Lithuania, the Ukraine and Baltic states as well as Finland
and Transcaucasia.
Four years after the war was ended Germany and Russia
formed a new alliance at Rapallo. This rapprochement was
the result of the international pariah status of both
nations. Germany was given sole responsibility for the
outbreak and destruction of the war and Russia was spurned
because of her new totalitarian regime under the Bolsheviks.
As a result of their desperate economic and political
situation, both states signed the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922
and initiated normal diplomatic and commercial relations.
The Germans, like other Europeans, were distrustful of
Bolshevism, but found the Russian contacts extremely
beneficial for commercial trade and particularly for the
military collaboration which helped both sides to bypass the
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty also
allowed both states to finally emerge from diplomatic
isolation as they supplemented the agreement with a treaty
of friendship and neutrality (that technically held until
Hitler's invasion in 1939).
The cooperative period in Russo-German relations was
interrupted by the rise of National Socialism in Germany in
the early 193 0s. Hitler was bent on expanding to the east
and was fervently anti-communist as well. The Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact of August 19 3 9 does not appear to have been
a genuine attempt at alliance. It was Hitler's attempt to
forestall intervention from Russia in his imminent attack on
Poland and Stalin's attempt to attain a sphere of interest
in Poland and gain assurance against a future German attack
on Russia. As history shows, Stalin was sadly disappointed.
During World War II the Soviets were almost defeated by
the Germans in the early stages of the Barbarossa campaign.
However, the Soviets recovered and successfully repelled the
Germans, and in the end, marched into Berlin (and remain
there to this day)
.
As it became obvious that the concessions made to the
Soviets at Tehran and Yalta served only to facilitate a
permanent Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and East
Germany, an even deeper enmity (now ideological) than that
occasioned by World War II became entrenched between East
and West, and manifested as the Cold War. Soviet communism,
through its expansionist, messianic goals and overt
hostility to Western democracy and capitalism (for which
West Germany now has a tradition) , will continue to be the
source of deep conflict between the Eastern and Western
power blocs and so between West Germany and the Soviet
Union.
In the years of detente this conflict has gone
underground as efforts at rapprochement flourish. Yet, this
rapprochement differs from that of the past, for it is
closely monitored by a western superpower (the U.S.) on
which the FRG depends for its security. For a West Germany
weary of the estrangement between the two halves of Germany
and Europe, detente is an effort to make Europe's division
bearable and perhaps evolutionary. For the Soviet Union it
is a way to continue its war against capitalism "by other
means" (other than hot or cold war) . To the Soviets the
exploitation of the Federal Republic of Germany's political
and physical vulnerabilities is an excellent "means" to
attain its foreign policy goals in the region. These goals
will be the next point of discussion.
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II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES
A. MEDIUM-LONG TERM GOALS IN EUROPE
The Soviet Union hopes to displace American influence
and power in Western Europe while ensuring that it is not
replaced with greater West European political or military
unity. The Kremlin would like to see Western Europe
distance itself from the United States as detente-inspired
arms control diminishes the credibility (i.e., the likely
operational effectiveness) of the U.S. security guarantee.
The Soviets also hope that the closer East-West ties of
detente will help make Western Europe more economically
dependent on the East while convincing West Europeans to
lower their guard militarily as a result of reduced
tensions. The desired result would be a fragmented Western
Europe sufficiently intimidated by Soviet military might and
the threat of economic sanctions to accept Soviet hegemony.
The Soviets could preside over a very lopsided, but still
bipolar Europe or proceed a step further, and head a
pan-European security system. Both goals are consistent
with Soviet aims to weaken Atlantic cohesion while
precluding its replacement with increased West European
11
solidarity and eventually gaining maximum control over
European security. 5
B. SOVIET STRATEGY IN PEACETIME
Before discussing Soviet objectives further, some of the
components of Soviet peacetime strategy for political change
should be briefly outlined. Soviet internal security
requirements, Soviet concerns with expediency and low risk
and the role of Soviet military power will be emphasized.
1. Internal Security
The Kremlin has as a primary concern in its
peacetime strategy to maintain its internal security,
particularly in the USSR proper and its East European sphere
of influence. In working toward its long term goal of
hegemony over Europe the Kremlin hopes to replace
Atlanticism with a form of Europeanism. That is, Moscow
would like to replace West German (and West European) bonds
to the U.S. with a pan-European system led by the Soviet
Union. A Western Europe independent of the U.S. must,
however, not be too independent or strong. A cohesive
Western Europe not only provides a new, perhaps even
stronger challenge to Soviet control, but a possible magnet
to East European political aspirations.
Conversely, a Western Europe abruptly severed from
its Atlantic sponsor could become immediately disunited and
5Laqueur, Russian and Germany: A Century of Conflict ,
p. 16.
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weak, thereby also providing a risk to the East's internal
security by reducing the perceived threat from the West.
Stability in the Warsaw Pact relies heavily on the image of
a dangerous external threat. The Soviet leadership must
prevent the idea of a relaxation in tensions with the
"aggressive Capitalist West" from leading the East European
and Soviet publics to question their totalitarian regimes.
This would be much more difficult if Western Europe were
suddenly fragmented and floundering.
The Soviets view the middle ground between a
cohesive Atlantic Alliance and a unified Europe as very
narrow and precarious. They fear that if the former were to
fall apart the latter could rapidly form. 6 This is why they
choose to widen this middle ground by exploiting the
Alliance, and attempting to transform it gradually into a
weaker organization rather than working to drive a permanent
wedge between Western Europe and the United States (and
specifically between West Germany and the U.S.) to break up
NATO altogether.
2. Pragmatism and Low Risk
The past 7 years have demonstrated that Soviet
leaders are extremely cautious and expedient. Moscow has
displayed great consistency in its efforts to "divide and
6Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union and Western Europe,"
The Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente , ed. William E.





conquer" in order to pursue its hegemonic objectives, but
there appears to be much flexibility in the Kremlin's
tactical approach. The leadership uses whatever tactics
seem to be appropriate to manipulate situations as they
arise. Moscow's actions are not entirely ad hoc, however.
There are certain "programs," such as detente and arms
control, which provide the basic framework for Soviet
strategy. Using these programs as a guide the Kremlin seeks
to react to events or decisions occurring in the Atlantic
Alliance, or elsewhere, over which it has little control. 7
The Kremlin has discovered that this opportunism
lends itself to working with the governments in power in
Western Europe. It no longer seeks to rely on fomenting
communist revolution in the West in order to bring about a
change in the political order. In Western Europe and West
Germany particularly, it is much more practical politically
to conduct foreign policy with the parties in power since
the Communist parties are mostly small, weak and/or
Eurocommunistic (that is, they oppose Soviet domination of
world communism and Soviet internal repression of democracy
and civil rights as well as territorial expansion)
.
The expediency principle implies that the Soviets
will use any tactic that might bring the desired result in
7Angela E. Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," Areas
of Challenge for Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s , by
Gerrit W. Gong, Angela E. Stent, and Rebecca V. Strode
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 8.
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the situation which has presented itself. In other words,
the Kremlin will use offensive and defensive tactics; it
will attempt to seduce or to isolate, and often use opposing
tactics at once. This means that although Soviet strategy
toward Western Europe is best served by operating in the
status quo of the NATO Alliance and a wider detente the
Kremlin will also employ "wedge-driving" tactics (between
America and Western Europe) to cause disunity and
instability in the Atlantic Alliance.
The best example of the Soviets using various
tactics simultaneously is the massive Soviet campaign of
1982-83 to stop the U.S. deployment of INF (Intermediate
range Nuclear Force) missiles in Western Europe by
pressuring the West Europeans (particularly the West
Germans) not to accept them. The West Germans were promised
increased concessions on inter-German contacts and were also
threatened with a complete bar to further progress in
German-German relations. The Soviets also played on
tensions within NATO by advising the West Germans to beware
of the U.S. plans to wage a limited nuclear war in Central
Europe with the new weapons (perhaps even U.S. plans to use
European-based nuclear weapons in a first strike) ; they
were consequently urged by the Soviets to counteract their
principal ally's dangerous confrontational tendencies.
The Soviet leadership has historically been very
cautious in its efforts to expand its influence. Many
15
Sovietologists attribute this to Russian political culture.
Theoretically, the Soviets operate from a position of low
risk to reduce to a minimum the chances of failure and the
chance of forfeiting previous gains. This tendency to be
extremely cautious naturally promotes the use of peaceful
means to gain Soviet objectives and to be patient in
attaining them. Another reason the Soviets see no need to
hasten developments is that the Marxist-Leninist dialectic
ensures that the powerful forces of history will continue to
operate in their favor to bring about global socialism.
3 . Military Power
From the time of its inception the Soviet state has
suffered from a political inferiority complex. As a result,
the Soviet leadership has long sought a stronger world image
and the global political power that attends the achievement
of great power and superpower status. It attempted to reach
this goal by gaining positive recognition for its system of
government through the creation of a powerful industrialized
economy and a strong military. However, its totalitarian
regime continues to experience rejection in the West, and it
has consistently failed to achieve political or economic
legitimacy among its populace (at a minimum the system has
lost mass appeal) . Therefore, it has had to rely almost
solely on its tremendous military strength and the sheer
size of its empire to lay claim to the superpower status and
power it so desperately desires.
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In the late 1950 's, when the Soviets first achieved
the capability to produce ICBMs and the West perceived a
much greater military/nuclear threat from the East, Soviet
party chief Nikita Khrushchev was eager to try to translate
this development into political power. He staged the 1958
Berlin Crisis, attempting to force the West into an
agreement which would formally recognize the separation of
the two Germanys, end Western occupation rights in West
Berlin and preclude the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
the FRG. Khrushchev threatened to hand control over access
to West Berlin to. East Germany if a settlement was not
reached and to "rain missiles" on any power that might
attack East Germany as a result of these changes. In the
late 1960's Brezhnev quickly put the new Soviet strategic
parity with the U.S. to good political use by consolidating
Soviet power in East Europe and then embarking on his new
detente and arms control polices from a position of equal
superpower status.
From the Soviet Union's point of view, its
preponderant military power provides it with the best
possible warfighting capability, but more important, this
military power provides a decided advantage for winning the
peacetime political struggle for increased global influence.
Having achieved strategic parity (and, many believe,
superiority) and consequently, a degree of political parity
with the US plus international recognition as an equal
17
superpower, the Soviet Union can wield the appropriate
political power in Western Europe and specifically, in West
Germany. Moscow's nuclear and conventional forces serve to
overshadow US military power in the region and thereby call
American security guarantees to Western Europe into
question.
C. SHORT TERM GOALS IN EUROPE
In progressing toward its long term goal of European
hegemony the Soviet Union pursues the following near-term
objectives in Western Europe:
1. Protecting its World War II territorial gains from
internal or external challenge
c
2c Gradually lessening the American military, economic,
political and cultural presence in Western Europe.
3. Obtaining a voice in the defense policies of West




Securing economic and technological inputs for the
Soviet economy.
5o Obtaining leverage over the internal politics and
policies of West European countries, particularly on
matters that affect Soviet interests
.
6. Hindering progress toward West European political
unity under European Community (EC) or other
auspices. 8
The Soviet Union approaches these goals through its
detente policies from a position of military superiority.
This strategy allows the Soviets to improve political and
8John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western
Europe: Objectives, Instruments, Results (Santa Monica: The
Rand Corporation, 1986), p. 4.
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economic ties with the West while discouraging political or
military unity. Military superiority allows Moscow to keep
a tight rein on Eastern Europe while convincing the West
Europeans that the Kremlin deserves a voice in Western
security and defense matters, and that there exists a real
need for arms control.
The two policies (detente and military superiority)
complement one another. According to Pierre Hassner, a
recognized expert on Soviet-European relations, without
detente Soviet military superiority can encourage Atlantic
unity or European unity if the Atlantic connection is
viewed as unreliable. Conversely, detente, in the absence
of Soviet military superiority could raise East European
expectations as a result of increased Western contacts, and
hence cause instability in the area. Moscow's vocal
campaign for "military detente" shows that it understands
the potential for maximizing Soviet interests by using the
two policies together. 9
1. Detente: Bilateralism
The main thrust of Soviet detente policy has been to
form bilateral relations and agreements with the countries
of Western Europe. This policy has served to further
several Soviet goals. In the economic arena it has allowed
the Soviet Union to get the trade, credit and technical
transfers it so desperately required when it first chose a
9Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," p. 47.
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path of rapprochement with the West. But at the same time,
the Kremlin can undermine West European political and
economic unity by making bilateral agreements and refusing
to deal with West European organizations such as the
European Community (EC) . Additionally, the long term trade
agreements (some for 25 years) serve to build confidence
among West Europeans in the Soviet Union's peaceful
intentions. This perception of a reduced threat may help
to persuade West Europeans to build down militarily or at
least be less concerned over the Soviet military build-up.
Politically, the many bilateral and multilateral
agreements and treaties signed with West European nations in
the early detente years represented the fulfillment of
Soviet goals in themselves. From the Soviet-West German
Treaty of 1970 to the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 the
agreements served to gain formal recognition of and security
for Eastern Europe. Indeed, the Soviets have actively
continued to try to gain a droit de regard over West
European defense policies by limiting their options through
formal negotiations and treaties.
2 . Military Power: Arms Control
The important role preponderant military power plays
in gaining and legitimizing political status and power for
the Soviet Union has been described above. When combined
20
with the detente policies of political/economic bilateralism
and arms control these purposes become clearer.
As mentioned above, the Soviet Union hopes to
gradually gain a droit de regard or a legal and political
basis for objecting to future West European defense
initiatives. Through its clear military might the Soviet
Union has helped motivate the West Europeans to pursue arms
control negotiations. The added incentive has been the
Soviet threat to abrogate many detente-inspired agreements
which West Europeans cherish. These are agreements which
West Europeans prize for their high economic, political and
security value.
In this way the Soviets can press West Europeans to
be party to arms control agreements which may reduce their
own security. At the same time the Kremlin is given the
opportunity to reduce the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
and overall security guarantee to Western Europe by
pressuring it to reduce the level of arms in Central Europe.
This is clearly what occurred with the SALT I and II
treaties. These agreements codified Soviet superiority in
numbers of strategic launchers while leaving the West
Europeans exposed to vast new deployments of Soviet theater
nuclear forces, a class of weapons not limited in the
treaties. However, the West Europeans (and particularly the
West Germans) were keen on the U.S. signing and ratifying
the treaties since their failure might have resulted in the
21
destruction of all the highly valued economic and political
gains of detente and plunge the West into another Cold War.
D. OBJECTIVES IN THE FRG
As the most powerful and yet the most vulnerable of West
European nations the FRG is the focus and pivot of Soviet
strategy in the region. (The Federal Republic's political
and physical vulnerabilities are reviewed in Chapter III.)
In addition to the six policy objectives for Western Europe
mentioned above, the Kremlin has a seventh in West Germany.
That aim is to use its leverage in West Germany to affect
the policies of NATO and the United States. West Germany is
the key to Soviet influence on the U.S. and NATO because the
Federal Republic has the most to gain and the most to lose
in its relationship with the USSR. Torn between its strong
fears and needs vis a vis the Soviet Union on the one hand,
and its powerful position in NATO on the other, the FRG is
the best possible Soviet instrument of influence on
Washington and in NATO Europe.
The Soviet Union's power to fulfil West Germany's
security, trade and contact requirements with East Germany
and the Warsaw Pact nations is the source of its tremendous
leverage. The Kremlin has sought to use its detente
policies of bilateralism in economic and political
agreements as well as arms control to make the FRG more
dependent on the USSR economically and politically and less
closely linked with the U.S., especially in defense matters.
22
As a result of West Germany's great economic and military
strength and the Soviet Union's past history with it the
Kremlin is particularly interested in using its influence to
deny the FRG various defense options. The next chapter
examines more closely how the Soviet Union takes advantage
of West German interest in East-West ties to further its
goals in the FRG and NATO as a whole.
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III. SOVIET INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE IN THE FRG
West Germany's exposed geographic position and the
Soviet Union's veto power over the progress of East-West
trade and contacts are the basis for the FRG's great
vulnerability to Soviet political influence. West German
security concerns to the East and strong interests in
normalizing East-West relations make the FRG highly
susceptible to Soviet pressures. Soviet manipulation of
these interests allows the Kremlin to increase its influence
in the region and work toward its objective of reducing
NATO's security. These West German interests (which amount
to openings to Soviet influence) can be separated into the
two categories of physical and political vulnerabilities.
The physical vulnerabilities result from West Germany's
geostrategic position and deal with the FRG's interest in
its own and in West Berlin's security from Eastern attack.
The political vulnerabilities are the FRG's interests in
normalizing relations with East Germany and Eastern Europe.
Another political vulnerability is the Federal Republic's
sensitivity regarding Germany's role in World War II.
A. PHYSICAL VULNERABILITIES
1. Invasion Angst
In German the word Angst means anxiety or fear. The
West German fear of invasion from the East is a result of
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its geostrategic position, its history of war with the East
and its awareness of the ever larger specter of Soviet
military might. The FRG also contains many high-value
industrial and military targets and is heavily dependent on
allies for its defense. As the easternmost NATO nation in
Central Europe the FRG has Soviet troops stationed on its
border. The proximity to vast Soviet military might makes
the FRG especially sensitive to the possibility of becoming
the target of a nuclear attack or the battlefield of a
conventional war. Having several times experienced the
advance of Russian soldiers onto German territory and the
massive destruction associated with two world wars the
people of West Germany have developed strong fears of future
conflict on German soil.
The Soviet Union attempts to exploit these fears to
gain influence in Western security policy. This was evident
in Soviet efforts to pressure the FRG (and through the FRG,
the United States) into not carrying out the initial INF
deployments in 1983. The West Germans were threatened with
becoming the target of new Soviet countermissiles to be
placed in Eastern Europe. 10 The Soviets also alluded to
alleged U.S. plans to use the new weapons to launch the
first strike of a limited nuclear war, urging the West
Germans to counteract dangerous U.S. confrontational
10Roland Smith, Soviet Policy Towards West Germany ,
Adelphi Paper No. 203 (London: The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 2.
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tendencies. Such tactics were not only aimed at promoting
nuclear anxieties, but also at creating intra-NATO tensions.
Such statements may have also increased Soviet influence by
making some West Germans feel that they should take action
to prove NATO's peaceful intentions.
Although the Soviets were unsuccessful in stopping
the missile deployment, their tactics helped to mobilize an
enormous sector of the West German public to demonstrate
against the deployment. The anti-INF campaign in West
Germany was locally instigated, but was heavily infiltrated
by Soviet-backed German communists (DKP) and organized by
front organizations such as the World Peace Council (WPC). 11
With the (Soviet-backed) communist leadership the regional
campaign (with non-communist aims) was exploited to further
Soviet propaganda goals and spread fear among the German
populace of a nuclear war being fought on their territory.
As a result of its nuclear and invasion angst the
FRG has a strong interest in maintaining and improving its
security from the East. The main source of West German
security is the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The FRG also seeks
to improve its security by reducing East-West tensions and
promoting arms control. Bonn views arms control as a means
for redressing the East-West military imbalance (without new
weapons deployments) while reducing the overall numbers of
11J.A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European
Peace Movement," Problems of Communism , Vol. 31, No. 6
(November-December, 1982), p. 46.
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weapons (particularly nuclear ones) in Central Europe.
After experiencing the massive public opposition to the INF
deployments in 1983, the FRG feels that additional NATO
missile deployments in response to Soviet military growth
would be politically very difficult (or impossible,
according to some FRG officials) . In reducing East-West
tensions through arms control (particularly between the
superpowers) , Bonn hopes to promote its Ostpolitik goals of
increased normalization between the FRG and Eastern Europe.
Many West Germans fear that continued Western counter-
armament in the absence of arms control negotiations would
make the West appear more provocative to the Soviet Union,
perhaps cause a renewed arms race and plunge both sides into
a deep Cold War.
The West German interest in arms reductions can
readily be exploited by the Soviet Union, which chooses to
use arms control negotiations to reduce Western security and
improve its own military posture in Western Europe. The
Kremlin attempts to use arms reductions to reduce Western
security by degrading the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
guarantee, encouraging Western self-restraint in defense
investments and denying Western Europe fallback positions
regarding its defense. 12
12 Davis S. Yost, "Soviet Arms in Europe," Society , Vol
24, No. 5 (July-August 1987), p. 73.
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The U.S. nuclear guarantee is the FRG ' s (and Western
Europe's) primary deterrent to Soviet aggression. It is the
cement that binds together the Atlantic Alliance. The
Soviet Union seeks to weaken the credibility of the
guarantee (and thereby the Alliance) by entering into arms
control agreements which have asymmetrical effects and
consequently promote a more advantageous military posture
for the Soviet Union.
The SALT I and II agreements are examples of this.
The treaties codified Soviet superiority in numbers of ICBM
launchers, a superiority aggravated further by larger Soviet
missile throw-weights and greater Soviet investments in
hardening and other passive defenses. The relaxation of
tension attendant to the arms control environment caused the
U.S. to fail to harden its own ICBM arsenals to a comparable
degree or to invest in mobility or other survivability
measures. Active defense of the U.S. ICBM force was ruled
out by the ABM Treaty. The resulting U.S. ICBM
vulnerability served to reduce the credibility of the U.S.
nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. 13
It can also be argued that, by focusing on strategic
arms limitation during this period, the U.S. further
degraded its security guarantee to Western Europe by failing
to seek limitation of theater nuclear weapons causing
unrestrained Soviet increases in this class of weapons in
13 Yost, "Soviet Arms in Europe," p. 73.
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Europe. This situation helped to prompt the NATO dual-track
decision of 1979 which resulted in the 1983 INF deployment.
The strong Western desire to reach an agreement once
negotiations are entered into usually results in the
codification of continued Soviet superiority in the class of
arms being discussed. As a result of the agreement to
remove LRINF (Long Range INF) and SRINF (Short Range INF)
forces from Europe, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
guarantee will be degraded still further (at least in some
critical sectors of West European opinion) as highly
visible, politically significant U.S. forces will be
withdrawn from the theater. At the same time the Soviets
will retain a huge superiority in numbers of short range
mobile missile launchers in theater (such as SS-21s)
.
Additionally, such an agreement might mean the beginning of
the de-nuclearization of Western Europe (an explicit Soviet
objective) , which would eliminate the nuclear guarantee to
Western Europe almost entirely. Western Europe's confidence
in U.S. "coupling" could be degraded, and Western Europe
would still be left open to vastly superior Soviet
conventional forces and Soviet nuclear and chemical attack
systems based in Eastern Europe.
The Kremlin also seeks to exploit West German
interests in arms control to deny it certain defense
fallback positions. The Soviet Union has directed its
efforts primarily at keeping the FRG from acquiring a
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nuclear deterrent or controlling NATO nuclear weapons. This
was one of the principal motivations—and perhaps even the
main motive—behind Soviet efforts in the 1960 's to produce
a nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) . West German and
NATO desires to keep the FRG non-nuclear were the main impe-
tus in the West behind the FRG ' s becoming a signatory to
the NPT, which bars it from producing nuclear weapons. The
USSR has only the power to report a suspected treaty viola-
tion to the Intternational Atomic Energy Agency. (The FRG
can withdraw from the agreement with three months notice)
.
14
Another method used to gain a level of Soviet
control over future West German access to nuclear weapons is
the Kremlin's effort to create a nuclear weapons free zone
(NWFZ) in Central Europe. Moscow has also sought to gain
pledges of no-first-use of nuclear weapons from NATO nuclear
states. The present CDU/CSU-FDP (Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Socialist Union-Free Democratic Party)
government has been unwilling to encourage the formulation
of such pledges by the FRG s nuclear allies because they
would fundamentally compromise the U.S. nuclear guarantee.
The SPD, however, has completed a draft of such an agreement
with the SED (Socialist Unity Party of the GDR)
.
Because of Germany's almost complete destruction in
World War II, the FRG has an understandable interest in
peace. When one also considers the FRG ' s desires to reduce
14 Yost, "Soviet Arms in Europe," p. 77.
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East-West tensions to pursue its Ostpolitik , it is easy to
see how the Soviet peace campaign slogans decrying nuclear
weapons as inherently evil might fall on receptive ears. By
exploiting the West German public's fears of nuclear war the
Soviets have made strides in reducing West German and West
European security. Through its propaganda and peace
campaigning the Kremlin has produced pressures to continue
to achieve arms control agreements that are assymetrical in
their effects and that favor continued Soviet military
superiority. Additionally, the heightened public awareness
and awakened public opposition that resulted from the peace
campaigns of the 1970' s and 1980' s have made it virtually
impossible for the FRG to significantly increase defense
investments. The Soviet peace rhetoric has also helped
reduce the West German perception of the Soviet threat and
consequently helped produce the lack of a perceived
political necessity to spend more on defense. This
development along with current economic constraints (as well
as the model of lower growth rates in the U.S. defense
budget) has resulted in stagnant FRG defense spending.
2 . Berlin
West Germany continues to have a strong interest in
maintaining close ties with West Berlin and in assuring its
security. Owing to the highly exposed position of West
Berlin and the Soviet Union's role as one of the four powers
governing the divided city, West Germany is highly
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dependent on Moscow to frustrate or further these important
interests. As a result of Four Power rule neither the FRG
nor the GDR have any legal control over Berlin (although the
GDR regularly contests this and the USSR will agree when it
is convenient) . Hence, West Berlin is an obvious
vulnerability for the FRG and so a political asset and
instrument of influence for the Soviet Union.
The Kremlin has historically used Western access to
Berlin and the city's status as both carrot and stick in
urging Bonn to do its bidding. The two Berlin Crises were
both attempts to use access to West Berlin as a negative
incentive to keep West Germany from rearming and becoming a
nuclear power
.
In the Spring of 1948 when the three Western zones
of occupied Germany united and adopted a currency reform, it
became obvious that a new independent German state was about
to be formed, and that its rearmament could soon follow.
In an effort to halt this sequence of events the Soviet
Union responded with the blockade of West Berlin. The
subsequent U.S. airlift foiled the Soviet venture.
In the Berlin Crisis of 1958 the Soviet Union
attempted to pressure the U.S., Britain and France into an
agreement to remove their occupation forces from Berlin, to
recognize East Germany and have West Germany leave NATO.
The ultimatum called for an agreement within six months or
control of access to West Berlin would be turned over to
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East Germany. Western noncompliance with the demands
resulted in the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Most
recently, the Soviets followed through with threats to
hamper access to the city again by causing trouble in the
West Berlin air corridors after US INF missiles were
deployed in West Germany. 15
Judging from the outcomes of these events, it
appears that the Soviet Union has had little success in
using Berlin as a "stick" to pressure West Germany and the
U.S. into security alternatives that are favorable to it.
During the Berlin Crises the U.S. was willing to call the
Kremlin's bluff, perhaps because Khrushchev had already lost
his credibility by falsely threatening rockets and bombs
over Suez and landings in Lebanon and Jordan. 16
In any case, the Kremlin continues to take advantage
of opportunities to remind West Germany that it depends on
Soviet magnanimity for the smooth functioning of the Four
Power agreement. In June of 1981 the GDR elected delegates
to its legislature directly from East Berlin. This was in
direct violation of the Western interpretation of the 1971
agreement. Neither the GDR nor the FRG can directly elect
15Angela E. Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," Areas
of Challenge for Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980 's by
Gerrit W. Gong, Angela E. Stent and Rebecca V. Strode
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 8.
16Adam B. Ulam, "The Perils of Khrushchev," Expansion
and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973 , 2nd ed.
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), p. 620.
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delegates from Berlin to their national legislatures because
Berlin remains under Four Power control. 17
The position of Berlin is much more secure, from the
Western point of view, since the Quadripartite Treaty was
signed in 1971. The treaty commits the USSR to ensure
unimpeded access to Berlin from West Germany and to
recognize the significance of West German ties to West
Berlin. The USSR has even gone so far as to hold the status
of Berlin practically immune from the periodic surges of
East-West tension and make it an "island of detente." This
may show that the Soviets see more utility in the
maintenance of the improved status of Berlin as a "carrot"
to convince the FRG of the benefits to be obtained if it
fails to support American policies that the Soviets consider
sources of increased East-West tensions. 18 Indeed, since
the improvements in the status of Berlin have proved to be
the most tangible and reliable fruits of detente for the
FRG, they have been one of the main reasons for West
Germany ' s continued staunch commitment to Ostpolitik and
detente. This commitment usually works to the advantage of
the Soviets when they seek to bring the U.S. and NATO back
to a softer line after Soviet aggression has caused
East-West relations to cool.
17Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," p. 19
18Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," p. 20
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B. POLITICAL VULNERABILITIES
West Germany's political vulnerabilities to Soviet
influence spring from its desire to normalize and stabilize
relations with Eastern Europe (particularly East Germany) in
order to minimize the effects of the division of Europe and
Germany. The main avenue for normalizing relations has been
trade, although improved East-West contacts in the form of
eased travel and emigration restrictions have also figured
prominently. The FRG's aspirations regarding improved
inter-German relations ( Deutschlandpolitik ) and relations
with the Warsaw Pact ( Ostpolitik ) are inspired by the belief
that this normalization will enhance overall European
stability and West European security and even cause the
Soviet Union to loosen its grip somewhat over the East bloc.
Because the Federal Republic so strongly desires these
improvements and because the Soviet Union must ultimately
approve them, the Kremlin seeks to use them to influence
West German and NATO foreign policy. An additional
political vulnerability which Moscow attempts to use as an
instrument of influence is the Federal Republic's
sensitivity regarding Germany's belligerent past,
particularly the Nazi period. The West German political and
economic vulnerabilities associated with its Ostpolitik will
be discussed first.
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1. Ostpolitik: East-West Trade19
a. History and Theory
To understand the theory of Ostpolitik it is
useful to look briefly at its evolution. After the
creation of the West German state in 1949 Chancellor
Adenauer followed a "policy of strength" aimed at
withholding legitimacy and permanence from Eastern Germany
by conducting no relations with the GDR or any state that
recognized it, which included the whole of Eastern Europe
(the main premise of the Hallstein Doctrine) . The goal was
to force a change in the political order of Europe and
promote German reunification by nonrecognition and
nonratification of the new postwar borders of Eastern
Europe. Besides being ineffective, the policy became
completely undermined by the U.S. choice to break with it
and pursue a policy of detente with the USSR following the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After the bout with nuclear
brinkmanship President Kennedy was interested in East-West
stabilization through arms control. He also felt that
German reunification was no longer a realistic objective,
and so chose to stop pursuing it, leaving Adenauer to go it
alone with the policy of strength.
19 In this section the author has borrowed heavily from
Josef Joffe's chapter, "The View from Bonn: The Tacit
Alliance," in Eroding Empire: Western Relations with




Unwilling to give up its raison de nation at
this point, the FRG began its "policy of movement." The
policy, as the name implies, was dedicated to making
openings to the East through economic engagement while still
bypassing the GDR and the Soviet Union. The policy was
predictably and successfully blocked by the Soviets, and was
then replaced in 1966 with Willy Brandt's Ostoolitik . The
new policy of the CDU/CSU-SPD (Christian Democratic Union/
Christian Social Union-Social Democratic Party) Grand
Coalition government was aimed at achieving stabilization
and normalization of relations with the East through detente
without many of Adenauer's preconditions. The Hallstein
Doctrine was dismantled and reunification was removed as the
price of detente in Europe, though it remained the
evolutionary goal. However, it was not until 1969, with the
election of an SPD government, that West Germany was willing
to take the final steps of rapprochement with the East and
affirm the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe and
recognize the GDR (albeit as a state within one German
nation) . To formally take these steps renunciation of force
treaties were signed with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague and the
Basic Treaty with the GDR (regulating state to state
relations)
.
The New Ostpolitik was a complete break with
past policy. It replaced denial and isolation with
engagement and cooperation, yet the goal of changing the
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political order of Europe remained the same. It was hoped
that by accepting the status quo in Eastern Europe and
pursuing a completely non-confrontational policy toward the
East that the Soviets would be reassured of the West's
cooperative goals and consequently relax control over
East-West trade and contacts, and even extend domestic
freedoms to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The intention
was (and is) that Ostpolitik would provide the modus vivendi
in a divided Europe that would bring about an evolution of
the East-West borders so thorough as to make them
insignificant. At the same time it was hoped that the
Kremlin's being reassured about peaceful Western intentions
would naturally improve the FRG's security vis a vis the
East. According to Hans Dietrich Genscher, the FDP West
German Foreign Minister, Ostpolitik
...is intended, in the short term to mitigate the
effects of the division of Europe and, in the long term,
to foster an evolutionary process in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union itself, leading to a greater freedom for
the people in the East and to a genuine peace order in
Europe. 2°
These goals for West German Ostpolitik have not
changed up to the present day; even a conservative
government (the current CDU/CSU-FDP coalition) has not
altered the policy. The policy, which is viewed as the
ultimate stabilizing factor between the superpowers of East
and West has taken on an even greater significance as
20
"Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace,
Freedom and Progress," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1982), p. 43.
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American leadership appears (to West Europeans) alternately
untrustworthy and confrontational (and always unpredicta-
ble) . West Germany's special relationships with the U.S.
and the USSR cause it to often act as arbiter between the
two. However, its perceived dependence on both for its
security leave it with less than complete freedom of action
in its foreign policy. This is why the FRG's interest in
Ostpolitik constitutes such a deep vulnerability to Soviet
influence in that country.
b. Soviet Westpolitik
Soviet Westpolitik means taking advantage of
West German Ostpolitik (and West European detente policies)
.
Soviet interests deal primarily with increased political
influence, but are economic, as well. The Soviet Union
exploits West German interests in normalized relations with
Eastern Europe to achieve its own goals by extending or
withdrawing desired trade and contact concessions to promote
policies favorable to it (the perennial "carrot and stick"
approach) . Before and after the U.S. INF missiles were
deployed in West Germany, the FRG was promised several new
trade and contact concessions as well as threatened with the
loss of existing agreements. The FRG was also threatened
with economic reprisals if it joined the U.S. in trade
sanctions against the USSR after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
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As yet, the Soviet Union has not carried out any
of these threats against West Germany in its efforts to
influence FRG security policy. Moscow appears to favor
offering inducements. It uses this tactic in the hopes of
promoting long term trade agreements. Such agreements
(particularly bilateral ones) allow the Kremlin to promote
its peaceful (and hegemonic) intentions while undercutting
the EC (European Community) and European unity. It also
makes Moscow appear reliable and promotes a gradual
deepening of West German (and West European) economic
dependence on the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Soviet
Union profits economically from West German trade due to its
great need for manufactures, high-technology transfers and
hard currency from the West.
As in its political agreements the Soviet Union
seeks to codify and legalize economic bilateral commitments.
In 1978 the USSR and FRG signed a 25-year agreement which
commits them to increasing the range and extent of their
bilateral trade and thus provides the desired institutional
framework for further long term economic ties. 21 The next
section will explore the extent of West Germany's economic
stake in Ostpolitik .
21Angela Stent, "The USSR and Germany," Problems in
Communism (September-October 1981), p. 10.
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c. Energy and Economic Dependency22
The Ostpolitik achievements of East-West trade
agreements are primarily political (perceived gains in
stability and security) , but as trade expands (particularly
in energy) the gains become economic as well. As East-West
trade becomes more valuable to West Germany it becomes more
significant as an instrument of influence for Moscow.
Additionally, as markets for higher priced or less
technologically advanced products become harder to find (let
alone guarantee) , West German trade agreements with Eastern
Europe may take on a new significance. 23
Although West Germany seeks economic interdepen-
dence with the Warsaw Pact to achieve political goals, it
takes some measures to guard against overdependence on the
East (particularly in energy) . These will be discussed
further below.
The United States, however, remains concerned
that West Germany has become too dependent on Eastern bloc
trade both for its economic and political rewards,
particularly since the FRG seems unwilling to relinquish any
of its agreements to participate in U.S. sanctions against
the USSR or the East bloc. It is significant to note, when
22This section borrows heavily from the ideas of John
Van Oudenaren in The Urenqoi Pipeline: Prospects for Soviet
Leverage (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1984)
.




considering West German and Soviet efforts to promote a
level of economic dependence of one on the other, a
particular asymmetry of effects; a totalitarian and
basically autarkic system will be much more immune to
economic dependence than a democratic, capitalistic system.
West German trade with CMEA (Community for
Mutual Economic Assistance) countries comprises a small
portion of its overall trade. Indeed, the Soviet share of
the West German market is less than that achieved by
countries who have in the past used trade effectively as an
instrument of political control. 24 Currently, only 2.8
percent of FRG trade is with the USSR and 8 percent with
Eastern Europe, but for certain industries and firms the
export markets in the East are crucial. 25 This is because
the Warsaw Pact is such a large market (and one of the few
such markets) for goods appropriate for industrializing
countries (the largest for West Germany). 26 In the
export-dependent machine-tool industry the Soviet Union is
responsible for 11 percent of West German exports; 27 for
24Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for
Soviet Leverage , p. 36.
25Stent, "The USSR and Germany," p. 9.
26Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for
Soviet Leverage , p. 36.
27Jess Lukomski, "Bonn Seeking Closer Moscow Trade
Ties," Journal of Commerce . November 15, 1983, cited in John
Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for Soviet
Leverage (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1984), p. 36.
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many machine-tool firms the Eastern bloc takes as much as 50
percent of their production. 28 In the metals sector, the
steel giant Mannesman exports 60 percent of its large
diameter pipe to the Soviet Union (one of its factories
produces this pipe solely for the USSR) . Overall, a total
of 92,000 West Germans are employed in export trade with the
Soviet Union. 29 Much of this trade is a direct result of
the building of two Soviet natural gas pipelines to Western
Europe, one completed in 1970 and the other in 1983. This
brings up the question of West German vulnerability through
economic dependence on the Soviet Union for energy.
In energy, unlike other industries, the Soviet
Union has a larger market share in West European and West
German supply. West Germany is 3 percent dependent on
Soviet natural gas and 5 percent for its total energy needs.
Also, in certain parts of the FRG, such as Bavaria, these
dependency figures are much higher still.
The FRG (and France and Italy) have made
concerted efforts to limit energy dependence by diversifying
energy sources (natural gas from Norway and the
Netherlands) , storing reserves, and using dual fired burners
in industry whereby power stations can switch from gas to
28Wolfgang Hoffman, "Fuer den Osten Nichts Neues," Die
Zeit . 13 May 1983, cited in John Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi




29Stent, "The USSR and Germany," p. 11.
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coal or oil. These measures are adequate for the present,
but with the world oil market expected to get tighter, West
Germans (and West Europeans) will find it necessary to
import more natural gas in the future. And with other
nations cutting back on production and raising prices Soviet
and Algerian gas may be the most affordable and available
sources in the 199 O's, when West Germans may be needing 20
percent more natural gas from outside Europe. It will be
particularly difficult to turn to other sources of energy if
imports remain tied to exports of West German manufactured
goods which are not that marketable elsewhere.
In light of increased West European dependence
on Soviet energy it is necessary to explore the
possibilities for actual use of natural gas cutoffs as
political leverage. The Soviets* past record shows them
willing to use energy supplies as a political tool. In 1948
the USSR cut off oil exports to Yugoslavia in response to
Tito's disobedience. In 1960 the same treatment was
extended to China and Albania. The Soviets used cheap oil
to try to bring Cuba into the Soviet bloc and then stopped
oil supplies in 1967 to try to force Castro into accepting
more Soviet influence in his foreign policy. In the
non-communist world there are fewer examples. In 1956 the
44
Soviet Union cut off oil supplies to Israel during the Suez
Conflict. 30
Despite this past behavior there are several
reasons which militate against the use of a gas cutoff by
the Soviets to influence West German and NATO behavior. The
USSR's detente objectives call for increasing Soviet
influence through the creation of long-term, stable
bilateral trade agreements with the West. This allows for a
gradual growth of dependence on Soviet energy, provides the
Soviets with much needed technology and hard currency and
confirms the Soviets' peaceful intentions, all paving the
way for the ultimate goal of an "all European" political
order. Steady, reliable energy (and other trade)
performance on the part of the Soviets enhances West
European dependence on these agreements and produces a
"system-preserving" situation wherein West Germans are less
likely to react to Soviet initiatives (military build-up and
third world engagements) or to support U.S. actions of which
the USSR disapproves. It is unlikely that the Soviets would
jeopardize these long term goals with an attempt to achieve
a short term political goal through a gas cutoff. 31
Although the Kremlin may threaten such a cutoff, it will be
cautious in making the threats and unlikely to carry them
30Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for
Soviet Leverage , p. 7.
31Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for
Soviet Leverage , p. 7.
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out, particularly in a period of oil and gas gluts on the
international market.
West Germany's vulnerability to such a cutoff
cannot be completely dismissed, however. According to John
Van Oudenaren,
The Soviet Union might resort to embargo in situations
where it felt itself on the defensive and compelled to
respond to a Western initiative. Developments that might
provoke such a response could include a crisis in Eastern
Europe involving real or perceived Western interference,
'provocative' US weapons deployments in Western Europe, or
the creation of a multinational West European nuclear
force. 32
Given the seriousness but unlikelihood of such occurrences,
the real danger to West Germany (and Western Europe) is the
possibility of its political immobilization resulting from
its desires to preserve the benefits of economic gains and
(perceived) political stability derived from greater
economic and energy dependence on the East.
One of the primary objectives of Soviet policy
in the FRG is to use its influence there to affect U.S.
behavior. The USSR attempts to benefit from the special
relationship between the U.S. and the Federal Republic by
exploiting its own privileged relationship with the FRG.
This can be accomplished, once again, by playing on the West
German interests in Ostpolitik .
The FRG believes that any confrontational
behavior (or actions that could be construed as such by the
32Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for
Soviet Leverage , p. vi.
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Soviets) would play into the hands of Soviet "hard liners"
waiting for an excuse to tighten the grip on Eastern Europe
and renew the Cold War. Therefore, Bonn will go far to try-
to convince the U.S. not to take retaliatory action
(political or economic) against the Soviet Union for what
Washington perceives as externally aggressive or internally
repressive Soviet behavior. This plays nicely into the
hands of the Soviets, who must be grateful for any help they
can receive in softening the U.S. hard line against them.
These West German efforts also cause disunity in the
Atlantic Alliance, which is another Soviet goal.
Perhaps the best examples of such actions on the
part of the FRG can be found in the Western reactions to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the imposition of
martial law in Poland in 1981. In both cases, the United
States chose to communicate its displeasure to the Kremlin
over Soviet actions via economic sanctions. Because of the
FRG's strong belief (more so than in the rest of Western
Europe) in the political value of East-West trade (and the
futility of economic sanctions) , Bonn refused to follow the
U.S. lead. The FRG displayed its unwillingness to break the
long term international trade agreements and treaties with
the East and suffer the possibly irretrievable loss of
perceived gains in stability and security. Both incidents
are described in more detail below.
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In early 1980, following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, President Carter chose to levy a grain embargo
against the Soviet Union in response to the military
aggression. He also embargoed various high-technology items
and heavy machine equipment. The economic effectiveness of
the embargo was greatly impaired by the lack of EC support
for the measures. The West Germans were indirectly
threatened with economic reprisals if they went along with
the U.S. sanctions. Theo Sommer, an editor for the German
weekly, Die Zeit , quoted a Soviet "functionary" as stating
that, "it is an open secret that you get not only natural
gas from us, but also a considerable quantity of strategic
raw materials. This has so far worked without any
restriction." 33 It is impossible to know if the implied
threat made a difference in its decision, but the West
German government chose to preserve Ostpolitik and
participate in the boycott of the Olympic games rather than
in the U.S. trade embargo.
The West German reactions to the incidents in
Poland (1980-82) are an even better example of West German
hopes and fears for Ostpolitik , and how these hopes further
Soviet objectives in Europe. From the beginning of the
33Theo Sommer, "The Kremlin Does not Believe in Words,"
Die Zeit , 4 April 1980, cited in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Daily Report: Western Europe, 4 April
1980.
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conflict the West Germans tried to downplay the issue and
focus attention on the "Polishness" of the crisis and away
from Soviet involvement. Willy Brandt, the then chairman of
the SPD, harshly criticized American involvement and
sanctions. He accused Washington of "indulging in an orgy
of impotence." 34 By stressing that Poland should be allowed
to solve its problems alone without interference from
abroad, Bonn was letting the Soviets know that if given some
positive signs (such as the softening of martial law) it
would try to forestall harsh American counter-measures. The
FRG was trying to promote the stability of the Polish regime
because a Russian invasion would destroy all the political
gains of Ostpol itik/detente . According to Josef Joffe,
...since Moscow is the ultimate arbiter of evolution in
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union must be reassured [of
Western non-intervention] even to the point where
Ostpolitik becomes a silent—and above all, discreet-
partner in the maintenance of regime stability and Soviet
authority in Eastern Europe. 35
This is why Chancellor Schmidt initially denied any Soviet
responsibility for the Jaruzelski coup and why Bonn worked
so hard to hold off Western sanctions.
Along with other major EC members West Germany
strenuously opposed the American embargo of high-technology
and other equipment for the construction of the Urengoi
34Joffe, "The View from Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," p.
159.
35Joffe, "The View from Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," p.
161.
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natural gas pipeline (from Siberia to Western Europe) . To
have supported the embargo would have meant breaking the
cardinal rules of Ostpolitik—to reassure instead of rattle,
to protect regional detente and to treat East Europeans as
tacit allies (rather than enemies) in seeking a more stable,
secure Central Europe. 36
A more recent incident involves the West German
decision to participate with the U.S. (and a few other
Western nations) in research activities for the U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) . Many high ranking
officials of the coalition government, particularly the
Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher (FDP leader) were
deeply concerned over the possible harm this decision might
have on East-West relations and arms control. The Soviets
have loudly expressed their strong opposition to the
development of SDI since President Reagan announced the
program.
As a result of the FDP and Minister Genscher'
s
skepticism, several conditions were added to the research
agreement to put some distance between FRG efforts and the
image of the project—an image of U.S. initiative in "arms
race" activity. These conditions reportedly include: no
financial contribution, no direct government role, no
political framework agreement, no involvement beyond the
162.
36Joffe, "The View from Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," p
50
initial research-only phase of SDI and assurances of U.S.
technology transfer to West Germany. Bonn obviously hopes
to reassure the Kremlin of its non-military, low-key
economic and technical involvement in the controversial
project. 37
In addition to fears that the project might be
perceived as provocative by the Soviets, the West Germans
have several other grounds for reservations about SDI
.
These include the possibility of the decoupling of U.S. and
West European defense as a result of Soviet BMD (Ballistic
Missile Defense) reducing the credibility of U.S. nuclear
guarantees. Bonn also fears possible destabilization
through a U.S. -Soviet BMD "arms race." West Germans argue
that if BMD systems reduced the utility of nuclear weapons,
it would only make Europe safer for a conventional war. 38
West German perceptions regarding the need to
preserve European stability and security by avoiding
confrontation with Moscow—and, indeed, seeking to reassure
the Soviets—tend to enhance Moscow's position and harm that
of the U.S. in Europe. The U.S. punitive actions against
the USSR have been repeatedly thwarted by the lack of FRG
and EC participation. In the Polish crisis the FRG was even
willing to subtly support Soviet repression in order to
37David S. Yost, "Western Europe and the Strategic
Defense Initiative," unpublished source, 1987, p. 30.
38Yost, "Western Europe and the Strategic Defense
Initiative," p. 30.
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avoid East-West confrontation. In the case of the U.S.
embargo for Urengoi pipeline equipment FRG and EC responses
forced the cancellation of the U.S. policy altogether.
2. Deutschlandoolitik
a. FRG Interest in Trade and Contacts with GDR
West Germany's deep aspirations for improved
inter-German relations ( Deutschlandoolitik ) provide another
powerful tool for Soviet leverage in the FRG. The Federal
Republic's strong interest in Deutschlandoolitik is both
political and emotional. Broader trade and contacts with
East Germany are pursued to achieve the political goals of
Ostoolitik . However, in the case of the GDR (as opposed to
the other nations of Eastern Europe) the residual sense of a
common German nationhood causes the efforts toward better
ties to be more fervent. The improved relations between the
Germanys are extremely important to West Germans, one
quarter of whom have relatives in East Germany. The gains
associated with better relations consist primarily of
improved conditions for travel and trade between East and
West Germany. This means reduced visitation fees (or
exchange requirements for travelling to the GDR) , the
ability to buy the freedom of West Germans imprisoned in the
GDR, and higher limits on East to West family contacts and
emigration.
Since the signing of the Moscow Treaty (1970)
and the Basic Treaty (1972) between the two Germanys and the
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Helsinki Final Act (the document approved in 1975 by the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) , in the
early detente years there have been great improvements in
all areas of relations between the two German states. For
example, in 1981 about 8 million West Germans visited the
GDR (which has a population of 17 million) compared to the
pre-detente figure of 2.5 million. 39 Because of the many
concrete gains achieved by the FRG, it has developed a
strong interest in continuing the detente (or Ostoolitik )
process to maintain and broaden the gains. The Soviet Union
can readily exploit this interest to influence policy in
the FRG, in the U.S. (through the FRG) and the rest of NATO
Europe. It does so by offering to grant new concessions in
inter-German relations or threatening to withdraw others to
elicit particular behavior from the FRG or its allies.
The Kremlin used this tool along with FRG
interest in a broader Ostoolitik with the Warsaw Pact to try
to influence West German reactions to the Afghanistan and
Polish Crises, and most recently in the anti-INF campaign.
Throughout the campaign from 1979 to 1983 the
Soviets alternately warned that inter-German ties would
suffer or promised that they would improve if the FRG
deployed (or did not deploy) the U.S. missiles on its soil.
The then Soviet Party Chief Yuri Andropov implied the
possibility of a severe worsening of relations when he said
39Stent, "The USSR and Germany," p. 17
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that the FRG and GDR would have to "... look at one another
through thick palisades of missiles" as a result of the
deployment. 40
b. Inter-German Relations
West Germany has so internalized its
Deutschlandool itik that today any party seeking election to
power in the FRG must be committed to continued gains in
inter-German relations. Relations between the two German
states have improved greatly since 1969 and therefore have
gained an important role in the detente process.
In the post-war years both the FRG and GDR were
staunchly opposed to relations with one another. Adenauer
sought to promote a renewed strength for the FRG as well as
reunification by not recognizing the GDR. The GDR, under
the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, employed the strictest
exclusionist policies in order to ensure stability in East
Germany, and to try to pressure West Germany into
recognition of the GDR as a separate nation.
Once the United States had begun its policies of
rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the early 1960's and
detente with the East had been formalized by NATO in the
Harmel Report of 1967, the Federal Republic faced the choice
of change or isolation in its Eastern policy. The Federal
40David S. Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West
Germany," Soviet Strategic Deception , ed. Brian Dailey and





Republic, as previously discussed, opted to follow the
Alliance policies. As the centerpiece of the New Ostpolitik
the FRG chose to extend recognition to the GDR as a separate
German state, but a state within one German nation. This
was not the full recognition of sovereignty that the East
Germans desired. Even beyond their dissatisfaction over
this the GDR remained opposed to any openings to West
Germany. East Berlin feared possible destabilization from
Western contacts, but Ulbricht also found it difficult to
give up his veto power with the Soviet Union over East-West
relations on the Continent. 41
The Kremlin, however, was prepared to open its
Westpolitik and extend concessions on inter-German relations
(and those with Eastern Europe) to the FRG in the hopes of
gaining badly needed technology and credits as well as
political influence there. For this reason Moscow replaced
the intransigent Ulbricht with Erich Honecker in 1971 as the
head of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) , and
began the process of normalizing relations with the West.
East Germany still practiced a policy of
Abarenzuna (limiting East-West contacts) , but as both states
began to make concessions to one another and the benefits
were felt the new Deutschlandpolitik grew and flourished.
As contacts and trade expanded, both nations gained a common
41Joffe, "The View from Bonn: The Tacit Alliance," p.
148.
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interest in the new benefits
—
particularly the economic
benefits garnered from their stronger ties.
Trade with East Germany is treated as domestic
trade and the GDR is, therefore, a de facto member of the
EC. The GDR derives great benefits from its own products
entering the European market on the same terms as those of
the FRG (no additional tariffs) . The GDR also receives FRG
investment and consumer goods, enjoys West German
construction of highways from East to West Germany and
"swing" credits between the two states (no-interest loans to
cover trade deficits with the FRG). 42 Besides gaining an
economic interest in improved ties, the GDR and FRG came to
realize that they had a political interest in minimizing the
chances of open conflict in Central Europe. Therefore, each
stood to lose if detente were to give way to renewed Cold
War.
For this reason, when the superpowers began to
experience a crisis of detente in the late 1970 's the
Germanys made strong efforts to preserve their
Deutschlandpol itik . Between the improved East-West contacts
and trade (and stabilization of the situation in Berlin) the
FRG and GDR had received the most tangible gains from
detente and had, therefore, developed an interest in
maintaining the gains.
42Stent, "The USSR and Germany," p. 19
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In the mid-1970' s the United States and NATO
became distressed over Soviet involvement in Marxist
revolutions in Angola and Ethiopia, but were unwilling to
give up detente in protest. The "crisis of detente"
deepened with the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The U.S. chose to cool relations with Moscow and levy trade
sanctions. In the same month NATO made the "dual track
decision" to modernize European theater nuclear forces to
help compensate for new Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles
in Eastern Europe (among other purposes) . The West European
governments (particularly France and the FRG) were, however,
most interested in saving detente as East-West tensions rose
as a result of both crises. They explained their efforts by
stating that Europe had to maintain detente so as to mediate
the new superpower standoff and avert East-West military
conflict. The East European governments were also reluctant
to join in the new freeze. On 30 April 1979 the GDR even
concluded a five-year 1,281 million dollar agreement with
the FRG for road, rail and water links between West Berlin
and Bonn. 43
When the unrest began in Poland in 1980 and
East-West relations grew cooler still, West Germany tried
yet again to maintain its Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik
by not participating in Western sanctions, and keeping
communication links open to the East. East Berlin had
43Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," p. 48.
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similar desires, but felt compelled to react defensively to
this crisis in the East Bloc. Although the possibility of a
free trade union movement appearing in East Germany was
slim, the East Berlin government, nevertheless feared the
Polish problems might be contagious. Therefore, the GDR
tightened its state contacts somewhat (including those to
the West) . In October several measures were passed to
reduce intra-German contacts including a doubling of the
minimum exchange fee for visitors from West to East
Germany. 44 Aside from less visitation from the West
inter-German contacts weathered the crisis well and
Deutschlandpol itik remained intact overall.
The next cooling period in East-West relations
occurred in 1983 after the INF missiles began to be deployed
in Western Europe. Yet again, West Germany and the GDR made
efforts to insulate their relations from superpower
tensions. During the anti-missile campaign the GDR had used
appeals to the common interests of all Germans to stop the
deployment and once the deployment was begun it maintained
its "national" approach. While criticizing the West German
decision, East Berlin spoke of "limiting the damage" to
inter-German relations. The East German government also
44Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," p. 48
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showed a marked lack of enthusiasm in accepting the Soviet
countermissiles on its soil. 45
Although the GDR has fulfilled strong desires in
its population by maintaining closer links with West Germany
and has gained enormous economic advantages from the
relationship, it still risks destabilization as a result of
the increased contacts. Because eighty percent of East
Germans watch West German television, the gap between
official information and the Western version of real world
events is more visible and bound to have effects on the
population. For example, during 1980 and 1981 Eastern
exposure to the West German peace movement in the media may
have contributed to the formation of an unofficial East
German version which condemned not only NATO missiles in
Western Europe, but Warsaw Pact nuclear strategy, as well. 46
c. Soviet-GDR Relations
Due to the Soviet Union's preponderant strength
and because the GDR ultimately relies on it for its own
legitimacy, the USSR will always have more to offer the GDR
than the GDR to it. However, East Germany is still the
Soviet Union's most important ally. The GDR is the Soviet
Union's biggest trading partner as well as its ideological
45Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed,"
Foreign Affairs (Winter 1984), p. 312.
46Edwina Moreton, "The German Factor," Soviet Strategy
Toward Western Europe , ed. by Edwina Moreton and Gerald
Segal (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 132.
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bulwark in the East bloc. Perhaps the GDR's greatest value
to the Soviet Union, however, is its ability to be used as a
Soviet military or political proxy in Western Europe and
beyond.
From a military perspective the Soviet Union can
use East German troops (even more readily than Cuban troops)
to support Marxist factions in Third World revolutions to
help distance itself from blame for superpower intervention.
More important, East Germany can be used as a tool to
increase Soviet influence in Western Europe through East
Berlin's relationship with Bonn.
This is not to say that the GDR simply takes
orders from the Soviet Union in its foreign policy-making.
The GDR has grown much stronger and more self-confident
since the post war years, and is consequently allowed more
maneuver in its decision-making. It is also in the
interest of both the GDR and the Soviet Union for East
Germany to appear more self-reliant and promote a stronger
image internationally. The close inter-German relationship
that detente has spawned provides the Soviets with an
excellent degree of access to the West. Therefore, as long
as the GDR's policies enhance Soviet interests it will
continue to be allowed a larger degree of independent
decision-making ability, while the Kremlin remains
well-informed and capable of intervening if necessary.
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As discussed above, there have been several cases
during the "crisis of detente" period (1975-1985) in which
the Soviet and East German policy lines did not converge.
In other words, the GDR maintained a softer stance toward
the West while the Soviets took a harsher approach, if only
in a steady stream of negative rhetoric.
There are various explanations for the
divergence in policies. It is possible that the GDR was
following a more forthcoming approach to preserve its
inter-German detente, and that the Kremlin allowed this so
that both threats and concessions could be used to try to
bring the U.S. and NATO back to a softer line. This
explanation gains credibility when one considers the stake
the Kremlin has built in the FRG commitment to Ostpolitik
and detente. If the FRG's most valuable gains of its
Deutschland and Ostoolitik prove to be transitory, the
Kremlin may lose its most powerful lever of influence in
NATO—the strong FRG support for detente.
It is also possible that the GDR policy did not
meet with the approval of the Kremlin, but as proposed
above, Moscow was perhaps reluctant to intervene (until
absolutely necessary) so as not to risk either the FRG's
commitment to detente or damaging the international image of
the GDR as a sovereign state. When superpower relations
became distant after the INF deployments began in 1983 (the
Soviets walked out of the START and INF talks in Geneva)
,
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the GDR joined FRG efforts to maintain close relations and
minimize the damage to renewed East-West tensions. The GDR
policy was at direct odds with that publicly maintained by
the Kremlin, but Moscow did not interfere until the
divergence became more acute. In the same year the GDR
accepted an unprecedented bank loan of DM 1 billion from the
FRG. 47 It appears that the Kremlin decided that the timing
of the loan deal (coming so soon after the missile
deployments and the Soviet response) was poor, and that
inter-German relations were becoming too close and
unsupervised. As a result, Erich Honecker was pressed by
Moscow to cancel his visit to the FRG and then forced to
mimic the renewed Soviet charges against West German
revanchism.
One can conclude from this action that the
Soviets remain in firm control of GDR foreign policy, and
that although contrasting policies (between it and the GDR)
may be useful , too great a divergence makes Moscow uneasy
about the closeness and autonomy of inter-German relations.
Of course, in the end, the GDR must always bend to Soviet
pressure since the legitimacy of its own rule is ultimately
guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 48
47Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," p. 8.
48 Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed," p. 314
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d. FRG Sensitivity Over Germany's Past
West Germans are still suffering from the
painful wounds of global disgrace resulting from the Hitler
movement and World War II (1933-1945) . The Soviet Union
ensures that these wounds remain open by periodically
exploiting this sensitivity through harsh rhetoric aimed at
shaming the FRG into action or inaction over NATO defense
measures. Soviet allegations of West German revanchism are
usually used in conjunction with other instruments to try to
increase Soviet influence over FRG policies. The Soviet
Union has also used the threat of West German revanchism as




Indeed, the only lull in the continuous barrage
of Soviet rhetoric decrying West German revanchism occurred
during the main part of the detente period from 1969-1979.
As soon as it appeared that the West Germans might be
forsaking their "peaceful" commitment to detente by
accepting U.S. INF missile deployments on their soil the
rhetoric began anew. Following is an excerpt from a TASS
article which criticizes the "militaristic" missile
deployments and the "undemocratic" forces at work in the
FRG, visible in the harsh treatment of peace demonstrators,
all resulting from revived West German revanchism:
49 Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," p. 2
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Sensible people are aware that there is a direct
relationship between Bonn's course of deploying nuclear
missiles and stepping up the militarization of West
Germany, on the one hand, and the marked revival of
revanchism, the toughening line of 'intimidation at home'
and the further restriction of the democratic rights of
broad sections of the population on the other. 50
When Chancellor Kohl visited Moscow in 1983 General
Secretary Andropov also alluded to Soviet fears of future
West German aggression as a result of the INF deployments
when he said,
It is planned to turn West German territory into a
launching site for American first-strike nuclear missiles
aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. This would
actually mean the revival of the threat of war against the
USSR being unleashed from German soil. 51
Statements like these attempt to use West German
guilt feelings and deep desires for continued detente to
promote the idea that Soviet fears brought on by Western
confrontationalism need to be counteracted with some form of
reassurance. West European efforts to take action to
reassure the Soviets (through arms reductions, for example)
can have the affect of improving the Soviet political and
military posture vis a vis Western Europe.
50h FRG peace Marches Protest US Missiles," TASS, 23
April 1984, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
USSR International Affairs , Vol. Ill, No. 81, 25 April 1984,
p. G9.
51Andropov remarks reported in TASS in Soviet World
Outlook . Vol. 8, No. 7, 15 July 1983, p. 3, cited in David
Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," Soviet
Strategic Deception , ed. by Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker
(Lexington and Toronto: DC Heath and Co., 1987), p. 356.
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Since the tactic of exploiting West Germany's
sensitivity over its past is usually employed in conjunction
with others, such as threats of losing concessions in
inter-German relations, it is difficult to judge the
effectiveness of this particular measure (or any other
specific measures for that matter)
.
The Soviet Union has also used statements
regarding West German revanchism in the hopes of promoting
disunity in the NATO Alliance by reminding the other West
European powers (particularly France) of the continuing need
to contain German power. This was the ploy used by Moscow
to try to block West German entry into the European Defense
Community after World War II, and to keep it from receiving
or gaining control over nuclear weapons. In the case of
becoming a nuclear power, the FRG has so thoroughly
internalized the remaining post war constraints on its
military power that such tactics are unnecessary. 52
The Soviet Union has also sought to legally
constrain the FRG's defense options by calling attention to
Germany's belligerent past. For instance, Moscow insisted
on the inclusion of the Enemy States clause in the United
Nations Charter. Article 53 of the Charter allows regional
enforcement action to be taken against an enemy state (World
52Gephard Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy: The
Domestic Setting , Washington Paper No. 106 (Washington,





War II enemy to any Charter signatory) without the
authorization of the Security Council. The clause thus
denies the FRG equal protection by Security Council
deliberation under the Charter.
In this section some light has been shed on how
the Soviet Union seeks to expand its influence in the FRG
and Western Europe through exploitation of West German
interests in East-West contacts, security from the East
and, in a more minor way, through the FRG's sensitivities
over its past. In the next chapter the success and failure




IV. ANALYSIS/ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES 53
A. ACCOMPLISHMENTS
If Soviet tactics are at least in part responsible for
persistent NATO disagreements (primarily between NATO Europe
and the U.S.) over how or even whether to respond to Soviet
aggression as well as the current trend toward the
denuclearization of Western Europe (via an INF agreement)
,
it seems the Soviets have indeed succeeded in expanding
their influence in the FRG and Western Europe as a whole.
The dynamic nature of the large number of variables at work
in political developments makes it very difficult to
determine which forces (Soviet or non-Soviet) should be
given the most credit for these accomplishments. In most
cases both types of factors are at work. The Soviets
sometimes bring their influence to bear on circumstances
already favorable to attaining their objectives and thereby
bring about a political victory.
In this section Soviet successes linked to the USSR's
detente policies, the growth of Soviet military power and,
more specifically, the West European Peace Campaign will be
53This section was heavily influenced by David S.
Yost's chapter, "The Soviet Campaign Against INF in West
Germany," in Soviet Strategic Deception , ed. by Brian D.
Dailey and Patrick J. Parker (Lexington, Massachusetts and
Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company), pp. 343-374.
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discussed. In each area both Soviet and non-Soviet factors
that may have contributed to the successes will be examined.
1. Detente
One of the main factors that has led to increased
Soviet influence in the FRG and in Western Europe has been
the Soviet detente policy established during the 1960's and
1970' s. Moscow has proven the reliability and benefits of
the many trade and contact agreements to West Germans (and
West Europeans)
,
who have developed an ever greater
political and economic stake in East-West rapprochement.
Therein lies the Soviet success. The West German (and West
European) motivation to preserve the detente system and the
process that created it will continue to support the
increasing political immobility of the FRG (and Western
Europe) in responding to Soviet aggression or repression.
The West German policy of Ostpolitik had its
beginnings in a German reaction to an American policy
switch . The eventual commitment to the policy came from
deep desires for the normalization of relations with East
Germany and Eastern Europe and later as a reaction to U.S.
policies toward the East bloc perceived (by West Europeans)
as overly aggressive. These are some of the non-Soviet
factors which supported an East-West rapprochement.
However, the West German (and West European) commitment to
detente and Ostpolitik was greatly strengthened by Soviet
efforts to make the improvements in inter-German and
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inter-European relations and the Berlin situation worthwhile
and secure (in the case of Berlin, secure even from
superpower tensions)
.
This commitment allows the Soviets to promote
disunity in NATO and weaken Western efforts to counter the
expansion of Soviet political influence. After both the
Afghanistan invasion and the Polish crisis neither West
Germany nor most of the EC nations were willing to join the
U.S. in punitive actions against the USSR in the form of
trade sanctions. In the case of the U.S. boycott of Western
technology and equipment for the Urengoi pipeline, the EC
opposition was so severe that the U.S. was forced to back
away from the policy altogether.
2 . Military Power
The steady build-up of military power by the Soviets
during the detente period and beyond has had a powerful
effect on the West German and West European psyche and has
consequently produced greater Soviet influence in NATO
policy. It is difficult to measure this factor since it
takes the form of a subliminal message reminding the FRG
(and "the continent") that a new war in Europe is perhaps
more likely to occur as the U.S. nuclear guarantee is
weakened and loses deterrent value (through increased Soviet
military might), and that such a war will be fatal. 54 This
54 Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," p
362.
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message has sometimes caused disunity in the Alliance as the
U.S. sees the need to respond aggressively and match the
Soviet military build-up, and the FRG and NATO perceive the
need to reduce tensions and seek arms control. According to
Pierre Hassner:
...the invasion of Afghanistan even seemed if anything, to
encourage [European] opposition to the implementation of
NATO's decision on theatre nuclear weapons, instead of
rendering it easier by demonstrating the seriousness of
the Soviet threat (as the action did to the American
public) . The increased plausibleness of military danger
appeared to lead to the conclusion that detente had to be
saved at all costs. 55
Both Soviet detente policies and the USSR's
increased military power have been responsible for the
strong Western interest in arms control (not to mention the
strong tendency toward such measures evident in Western
political culture) . In the period of reduced tensions, arms
control became an accepted way to reduce the threat of war
as a substitute for (rather than a complement to) achieving
an East-West military balance. 56 Non-Soviet factors
supporting this trend include the "aggressive" American
image (under Reagan in his first term) , West German sensi-
tivities about nuclear weapons and any war that might
involve German territory and the Western desire to believe
55Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," p. 48.
56Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," p,
362.
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in the benevolence (or at least non-threatening character)
of Soviet intentions.
Whatever the primary causes, the strong interest in
arms reductions was translated into an ongoing negotiations
process which serves to codify Soviet military superiority
(and heighten Western awareness of it) , and threatens to
further weaken the U.S. nuclear guarantee through the
signing of agreements with asymmetrical effects. Obviously,
the establishment of Western commitment to this process is a
great opportunity for Moscow. The recently ratified INF
treaty is an excellent example of the fruits of the process.
The treaty will remove all U.S. and Soviet long and short
range INF missiles (ground-based missiles with ranges
between 500 and 5500 km) from the world and appears to be a
first step toward the denuclearization of Western Europe.
The agreement may so thoroughly weaken West European
confidence in the credibility of U.S. nuclear commitments
that the USSR could greatly increase the intimidation factor
tied to its even greater margin of superiority in other
categories of military power.
3 . Protest Movements
The European Peace Campaign of the late 1970' s and
early 1980s played a significant role in increasing Soviet
influence in the region, particularly in West Germany. The
movement had regional roots (many of the West German
participants just switched the focus of their activism from
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opposing nuclear power and industrial waste to blocking new
U.S. weapons deployments), but large portions of the
decision-making posts (about 1/2 in West Germany) were held
by the local communist parties. This allowed the Soviets to
indirectly block criticism of the Soviet Union in the
movement (regarding the SS-20 missiles or Afghanistan) and
to gather information about European publics that would
allow the movement to use more effective propaganda. 57
The peace movement was instrumental in several
Soviet political successes. In West Germany it helped to
destroy the defense consensus by getting one of the main
political parties (SPD) to endorse policies that can assist
the Soviet Union in broadening its margin of military
superiority in Europe. The SPD now supports the Soviet
proposals for Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in Central Europe
and a no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy. The peace
movement also heightened the awareness of large portions of
the public regarding nuclear issues and dilemmas. As a
result of the increased public awareness of and concomitant
desires to solve nuclear issues without new weapons, many
experts in the FRG no longer consider it politically
feasible to deploy new U.S. missiles in the FRG. In this
way, the Kremlin has indirectly denied the FRG a defense
option. The movement also socialized the younger successor
57 Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," p,
349.
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generation into viewing both superpowers as equal partners
in a plan to further nuclearize Europe and prompted them to
seek distance from both. 58
The Soviet manipulation of the peace campaign
certainly played a large role in increasing Moscow's
influence in West Germany (as did such non-Soviet factors as
West European perceptions of American foreign policy
aggressiveness) . However, the anti-INF campaign only served
to magnify the forces that Soviet detente policies and
preponderant military power had already put into action. As
a result of these, West Germany and Western Europe had
developed a strong interest in reducing tensions and
increasing their security through arms control. These
interests only serve to improve the military posture of the





The overall success of Soviet policies in the FRG and
Western Europe seem to make it more appropriate to discuss
Soviet setbacks vice clear-cut failures in the region.
These would include the inability to block the first NATO
INF deployments in 1983 and the failure to destroy, to a
58Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany, 11 p.
346.
59 Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," p.
364.
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significant degree, the cohesiveness of the Atlantic
Alliance despite Soviet "wedge-driving" tactics.
One reason the anti-INF campaign may have failed is that
the peace movement was unable to produce a decisive majority
of INF opponents. Soviet over-confidence in the campaign
due to the perceived success of the late 1970' s peace
movement in stopping the West European deployment of the
neutron bomb (or Enhanced Radiation Weapon) may have been to
blame. The decision not to deploy the ERW appears to have
come about more as a result of President Carter's indecision
over the production and deployment of the controversial
weapon than any other reason. However, Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt's hesitancy to openly accept the bomb's deployment
in West Germany was believed by many to have resulted from
the large peace campaign mobilized to stop the deployment.
Another factor in the failure to halt the INF deployment
may have been the GDR's refusal to follow the Soviet line in
post INF punitive action toward West Germany. Continued
intra-German detente did much to aid the smooth deployment
of the missiles. 60 Whether or not this action was
deliberate due to the Kremlin's interest in maintaining the
FRG's commitment to detente cannot be known.
The other setback the Soviets have experienced in
attempting to expand their influence in Western Europe has
365.
60Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," p,
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to do with the continued cohesiveness of the Alliance. This
development is a result of a dilemma of Soviet military
power. Although preponderant military power remains a
useful tool of Soviet blackmail and intimidation, it
necessarily also serves to cause the Alliance to seek to
unite more closely against a more and more visibly powerful
foe. This is particularly true in an Alliance where only
the group's leader can defend itself alone against the
common enemy.
In summary, it appears the Soviets have experienced
significant success in expanding their influence in the FRG
and in Western Europe. The setbacks they have suffered seem
minor by comparison, yet are significant because they expose
the continued unity and resolve of the Alliance when faced
with important defense decisions despite the enhanced
military and political position of the Soviet Union in
Europe
.
Soviet successes in the region can in part be attributed
to the achievement of a firm West German (and West European)
commitment to the detente and arms control process. Perhaps
the greatest Soviet success of the period has been the
polarization of the CDU/CSU and Social Democratic parties in
West Germany over NATO nuclear policy in Europe. This may
have far-reaching consequences for NATO if an SPD government
comes to power in the FRG and does not moderate its current
policy line of creating a Central European NWFZ and
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accepting a no-first-use posture. 61 The next section will
discuss the future prospects of these successful policies
and some alternative outcomes should Moscow take a different
approach.
C. FUTURE PROSPECTS 62
1. Current Trends
In assessing future prospects for Soviet influence
in the FRG, one must first identify present trends and the
forces which operate to perpetuate or stifle them. The
status quo today remains that of a divided Germany in a
divided Europe. West Germany (and Western Europe) have
chosen to recognize and accept the division in order to make
the situation more bearable through detente (rather than
actively seek unification) . The status quo also involves
the perception (in the West) of a general regional and a
global balance of power between the superpowers and their
alliances. The perception has engendered a feeling of
security (or at least one of the non-imminence of war) and
stability in the West. This secure feeling in the current
detente atmosphere promotes political and military
nonvigilance in the West which allows the Soviet Union to
61Yost, "The Campaign Against INF in West Germany," p.
367.
62 In this section, the author has borrowed heavily from
Pierre Hassner's Change and Security in Europe Part I: The
Background and Part II: In Search of a System , Adelphi




more effectively increase its influence in West Germany (and
Western Europe). As the situation of Germany's and Europe's
division becomes "normal" and the gains of detente and
Ostpolitik are institutionalized, the West is in danger of
feeling it has won the Cold War. This perception could
instead lead to a victory for the Soviets in the form of
military superiority and greater influence in the defense
policies of West Germany and NATO.
This describes the current trend in which the
Soviets are moving toward a Status Quo Plus or increased
influence on West Germany and in NATO by capitalizing on
West German desires for East-West normalization and arms
control. In view of the most current efforts at East-West
arms control evident in the INF agreement, and the
continuing benefits in increased security and influence
accruing to Moscow as a result of its detente and arms
control efforts, it is unlikely that Moscow will change its
current policies. Western Europe (and particularly West
Germany) , have developed a large enough stake (in economic
and perceived political gains) in Ostpolitik and detente to
remain committed to this pattern. Therefore, it seems
likely that the trend toward a Status Quo Plus for the
Soviet Union will continue. Even so, it is useful to
examine some of the possible outcomes to a different,
perhaps more aggressive Soviet policy in West Germany aimed
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at producing a near-term, permanent split between the U.S.
and the FRG and perhaps to a break-up of NATO altogether.
2 . Dangerous Alternatives
If the Soviet Union were to pursue a more aggressive
"wedge-driving" policy in West Germany aimed at successfully
severing West German ties to the U.S. and NATO, several
different outcomes regarding the FRG's international status
could result. These would include a West Germany that was
free and non-aligned (neutral) , a possible West German
attempt at reunification or a West Germany that was
integrated into a more unified West European organization,
either political or military . Each of these alternatives
would provide Moscow with certain new security risks, a fact
that may militate against Moscow's seeking them as short
term objectives.
The first alternative of a non-aligned FRG seems to
be the most unlikely. Incapable of fully providing for her
own defense and positioned on the border of the Warsaw Pact,
the FRG needs to be within some kind of collective security
arrangement if it is to avoid becoming vulnerable to Soviet
coercion. Because of the country's size and strength, it
would be highly destabilizing to the regional and global
balance of power for the FRG to leave the Atlantic Alliance.
Therefore, it seems likely that the U.S. would exert
considerable pressure to deter the move. If a non-aligned
FRG were armed with a nuclear deterrent (however unlikely
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this occurrence) , the unpredictability of the situation
would become more uncomfortable and hence, less attractive
to the Soviets.
On the other hand, a neutral West Germany might have
definite attractions for Moscow because of the state's
greatly increased vulnerability to influence and attack.
However, a neutral FRG that presented a lesser threat to the
East and was unconstrained by reponsibilities to the West
might attempt to form a much closer relationship with East
Germany. This could present the Soviet Union with several
new problems. These might include less control over East
Berlin's relationship with Bonn, a lack of justification for
limiting East-West German contacts and the possible
destabilization resulting from both closer inter-German ties
and increased Western contacts.
This is not to say that an eventual end to FRG ties
to NATO and the U.S. is not desired by the USSR in the long
term, but that it could present several risks and problems
for the Soviets in the short run. Because the Kremlin knows
the chances of a break-up of NATO are relatively remote (due
to the FRG's ideological leanings and security require-
ments)
, it can easily continue its policy of exploiting the
relationships between NATO members and its own bilateral
relations with them to foster disunity in the alliance and
reduce U.S. influence in the FRG (and Western Europe)
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without being overly concerned about an abrupt or
destabilizing outcome.
This policy is furthered by the current popularity
in West Germany of the disarmament theme, and the desire by
the FDP and the left wing of the SPD to greatly improve ties
with the USSR. A gradual forging of increasingly closer
economic and political links between West Germany and the
USSR would necessarily weaken its ties to the Atlantic
Alliance while allowing an increase in Soviet influence.
The trend could weaken NATO to the point where it becomes an
impotent facade, while appearing to remain intact, making it
very difficult for the West to become aware of the subtle
process at work.
Another situation that might result from the FRG's
exit from NATO would be efforts at reunifying or creating a
confederation with East Germany. This alternative, too, is
highly unlikely, considering the opposing political
ideologies of both states. The Soviet Union's first
priority in its German policy is defending the communism of
the GDR which would be impossible under reunification. Even
if both superpowers had disengaged from Central Europe,
there would still remain ample European opposition to
reunification for fear of Germany once again attempting to
dominate the continent. Indeed, it would be difficult to
find any Eastern or Western support for a German
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reunification in the short term because of the possible
destabilization that might result from it.
Although West Germany is still committed to
reunification in its political rhetoric (as well as in its
constitution) , the real hopes for such an event have receded
considerably. This has mostly to do with the West German
unwillingness to trade any amount of freedom for
reunification, and the knowledge that the current separation
of the two Germanies must be fully accepted in order to
soften its effects. Both countries are also aware that
each's membership in its opposing alliance is in large part
responsible for the continued regional and global stability.
Both countries cannot afford to alienate themselves from the
leaders of their respective alliances and consequently
cannot pursue reunification. However, as both countries
continue to improve relations (although a de facto
reunification is too distant to be in sight) the situation
will continue to provide a greater and greater challenge for
bipolar control. 63
The last outcome of a NATO break-up to be explored
is perhaps the most feasible (and least attractive to the
Soviet Union) . It is that of a politically or militarily
unified Europe of which West Germany would be a part. This
outcome is possible in that a dissolution of NATO might be




the one impetus strong enough to motivate a union of the
highly diverse and strongly national West European
countries. Such a development would be highly undesirable
to the Soviet Union. Although Western Europe would present
a lesser deterrent than the Atlantic Alliance, it might
include more nuclear powers (including the FRG) ; it might be
more cohesive than NATO and consequently more impervious to
Soviet influence. 64 Because of the dangers of collective
control (if no West European leader emerged) such an
alliance could be more unpredictable and dangerous than
NATO.
In the current situation, with NATO intact, a
stronger West European pillar to the Alliance is highly
desirable but also highly unlikely. The existence of NATO
and the U.S. nuclear guarantee make it difficult to produce
the motivation needed for increased West European
cooperation politically and militarily as well as the
increased spending that such coordination and efforts toward
greater defense independence would require. Additionally,
the opposition has argued that such efforts would only
increase East-West tensions by making the Warsaw Pact feel
less secure. In the current period of renewed detente and
arms control, such moves (if the argument for renewed
64 Richard Pipes, "Detente: Moscow's View," Soviet
Strategy in Europe , ed. Richard Pipes (New York: Crane,
Russak and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 23.
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tensions is to be believed) would be highly unpopular in
Western Europe.
This is not to say that West Europeans have made no
attempts at political or military coordination. Such
efforts have been highly visible in such organizations as
the Western European Union (WEU) , the Eurogroup and the EPC
(European Political Cooperation) . These organizations have
not met with the level of success achieved in the EC in
economic integration (which is hardly unqualified) , but
their achievements deserve mention.
The EPC was founded in 1970 by the EC members to
help coordinate their respective foreign policies where
possible. The organization seeks to promote mutual
understanding and solidarity of action on important
international problems. For example, the EPC allowed its
members to reach an agreement for sanctions on Poland and to
coordinate their efforts during the Falklands Crisis, both
in 1982.
The Eurogroup was formed in 1968 to allow European
Defense Ministers to share their views on various issues,
including the European countribution to NATO, without the
presence of the American Secretary of Defense. The group
has made steady progress on some areas of arms cooperation
and in dispatching reports (particularly to the U.S.) on
European defense efforts.
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The WEU served originally to monitor West German
rearmament after World War II. This function has almost
disappeared, but the WEU remains in existence as an option
for the future of European defense. Both the Eurogroup and
WEU have also attempted to assist in coordinating European
arms production and procurement. Yet both have made little
progress in light of the EC's inability to agree on a
European industrial policy. 65
In addition to these efforts, current plans for a
Franco-German brigade and a Franco-German Defense Council
are noteworthy. However, these projects are still mainly
symbolic.
In summary, while the Soviets will maintain as a
long-term objective the severing of U.S. and NATO ties to
the FRG, the possible outcomes of a short-term rupture of
the Atlantic Alliance would appear to be too risky to be
worthwhile. The new leadership in the Kremlin seems to be
making efforts to regain the wider detente of the 1970'
s
when its foreign policy successes were most spectacular.
The decision to thaw US-Soviet relations (after a cooling in
the wake of the INF deployments)
,
including renewed arms
control and summitry, will serve to improve the USSR's
"peace-loving" image in the West and further enhance its
political position by reconfirming its superpower status.
65Stanley R. Sloan, NATO ' s Future : Toward a New
Transatlantic Bargain (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1985), p. 187.
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The Kremlin hopes to preserve the detente gains of the
1970 's and resume the momentum of increasing its influence
in the FRG and NATO to undercut that of the United States. 66




This paper has attempted to show how the Soviet Union
seeks to expand its influence in the FRG and NATO through
exploitation of West German interests in Ostpolitik .
security from the East, and the FRG's sensitivities over its
past. The well-established Soviet detente policies have
allowed the Kremlin to capitalize on West German (and West
European) interest in reduced East-West tensions as well as
conflicting Eastern policies in. the Western Alliance to
achieve some significant successes in displacing U.S.
influence and increasing its own in Western Europe.
These achievements can be divided into two areas. The
first is the trend toward increasing West German (and West
European) political immobility toward the East as a result
of the West's goals—to preserve the system and process of
detente and its perceived gains in security. This
development is also enhanced by the intimidation factor
inherent in the Soviet Union's preponderant military
strength. This immobility promotes a weakening of the
Alliance as the U.S. and Western Europe pursue divergent
policies toward the East.
The second area of achievement is in the popularization
of arms control in the West. As in the case of West German
and West European interest in the economic and political
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fruits of detente the interest in arms control has its roots
in "Western" factors. These include the desire to wish away
the threat by believing the Soviets "are just like us" and
have no expansionist designs. Other factors include West
German (and West European) anxiety over unpredictable U.S.
leadership and the belief that Moscow needs to be reassured
of the West's benign intentions. However, Soviet peace
propaganda (particularly through the West European Peace
Campaign) and intimidating rhetoric regarding nuclear
weapons have played a big role in exploiting West European
sensitivities to achieve the political success in the
current Western views of arms control as a solution to the
East-West military imbalance.
Although Soviet tactics have not succeeded in
significantly undermining the cohesiveness of the Western
Alliance (as was evident in the failure to halt the INF
deployments)
,
greater Soviet influence in NATO coupled with
NATO disunity over Eastern policy and weakened U.S.
leadership (and lower credibility in its security guarantee)
are indeed cause for concern (and action) . Three Western
countermeasures aimed at mitigating the effects of Soviet
policies will be proposed below.
First, the leadership in all NATO nations (but primarily
in the U.S. and the FRG) must work to arrest the populariza-
tion of arms control by openly supporting the deployment and
modernization of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of
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East-West military balance as deterrents to Soviet
aggression or coercion, and therefore as stabilizing
political factors. As long as NATO governments,
particularly conservative ones in Alliance leadership,
continue to echo the Soviet line that it is weapons
(particularly nuclear ones) that are destabilizing vice the
intentions and behavior of their owners, no progress can be
made in implementing effective political-military
countermeasures to Soviet policies. If Western publics were
made aware of the utility and benefits of nuclear weaponry
(as war deterrents) just as they were apprised of their
inherent dangers and dilemmas in the peace campaign, there
would be a chance that the Western populace could learn to
support more balanced policies vis a vis the Soviets rather
than arms control for arms reduction's sake only.
Secondly, the U.S. must provide more responsible,
consistent leadership for the Atlantic Alliance. The U.S.
system of government makes this difficult, but not
impossible, as conservative administrations turn over to
liberal ones with the predictable (and sometimes
unpredictable) changes in foreign policy. Soviet hegemonic
goals have not changed appreciably since the revolution and
their attainment is often inadvertently supported by an
inconsistent American implementation of traditional
containment doctrine. President Reagan's policy reversals
have been a startlingly vivid example of this inconsistency
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in Alliance leadership which so greatly weakens NATO and its
ability to counter Soviet policies. Not only has President
Reagan failed to consult with NATO allies before important
summits and policy decisions, but he has flouted accepted
NATO policy (by agreeing, in principle, to eliminate all
long range INF in Western Europe at the 1985 Reykjavik
Summit) and undermining the U.S. (and NATO) strategic
doctrine of Flexible Response by signing a treaty to
eliminate an entire class of weapons (long and short range
INF). The political reversal made in Reagan's second term
by choosing to pursue arms control rather than an East-West
military balance may shortly result in the removal of a
significant portion of the NATO nuclear deterrent from
Western Europe.
Lastly, both the U.S. and the FRG must make stronger
efforts at accommodation of one another's interests in order
to present a more unified front to the East. The U.S. must
recognize West Germany's legitimate long term aspirations in
the East, and should help support the FRG in attaining them
without undermining NATO unity and security. At the same
time the FRG should try to appreciate the U.S. position in
being ultimately responsible for challenging Soviet
expansionism. 67 Since their security objectives converge in
67John Van Oudenaren, "US-West German Relations and the
Soviet Problem," The Soviet Problem in American-German
Relations , ed. by Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson (New
York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1985), p. 118.
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NATO the two nations who lead the Alliance cannot allow
their differences in means of policy pursuit to continue to
erode the security of the Western Alliance and endanger the
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